and Apoorva Tapas** The deliberation on the lack of transparency and the vociferous demand for a mechanism to ensure accountability in public life has gathered momentum in the recent past. Judicial independence and accountability are the prerequisites for a transparent judiciary enjoying public confidence, which is the hallmark of a healthy democracy. This article seeks to examine the relationship between accountability and independence of the judiciary in view of the need and urgency of transparency, due to various controversies surrounding the Judiciary. The apparent dichotomy between the two is also elaborated. It is premised that judicial independence has an inextricable relationship with judicial accountability. The dichotomy between the two is rather superimposed and the need of the hour is to dispel this very myth.
Introduction
"In a pluralist society judges are the essential equalisers. They serve no majority or any minority either. Their duty is to the law and to justice. They do not bend the knee to the governments, to particular religions, to the military, to money, to tabloid media or the screaming mob. In upholding law and justice, judges have a vital function in a pluralist society to make sure that diversity is respected and the rights of all protected."
-Justice Michael Kirby 1
On numerous occasions, the activist stance and creative interpretation of the judiciary has proved that it plays a vital role in protecting individuals against the misuse of state power while functioning as the custodian of their rights. As the final arbiter and enforcer of the constitutional limitations on government, it has the power to prevent the powerful engines of executive authority from running amok and must therefore be above board in its moral standards in dispensation of justice. Being a cornerstone of democracy, 2 While many judicial decisions have shaped the Indian polity to a great extent, ensuring fairness in the process of governance, nonetheless, allegations questioning the integrity of this great institution have increased manifold, ascribable to the lack of transparency. Rampant corruption and lack of accountability have the presence of a strong, independent and efficient judiciary, both in letter and spirit, is indispensable for guaranteeing constitutional rights. diluted the trust reposed in the conscience keepers of the law. Legality is not legitimacy anymore for the Indian people. The 'consensual foundations' of the law are under a great stress. Our legal system suffers from endemic delays and is widely perceived to be an expensive affair. There is a dire need for judicial accountability to arise from within, to ensure a system of operative checks and balances to prevent any unwarranted usurping of power. Unfortunately, this has been met with resistance from within the judiciary, afraid of encroachment into the realm of its independence. This paper debates the ills which are affecting the Indian judiciary. It makes certain recommendations which can be adopted to ensure greater judicial accountability.
Corruption in Judiciary
In the last few decades, corruption has steadily spread its tentacles in the Indian judiciary. Corruption is encountered in the guise of bribery, influence peddling, intimidation and coercion. 3 Though the issue of accountability has plagued the judiciary for long, the recent spate of scandals have precipitated a crisis. Never before have such grave charges been levied against the judiciary.
It is driven by many factors including executive interference, lack of citizen voice, social pressure and low salaries. Judicial corruption in addition to corroding the rule of law also undermines the effectiveness of other institutions. Even judges of the High Court and Supreme Court are suspected of bribery and delinquency. Today, the decrepit judiciary suffers from a syndrome of unbecoming behaviour. 5 The lack of judicial accountability is visibly acute in the higher judiciary, since the lower judiciary is accountable to the High Courts. 6
'Absolute Power Corrupts': Impeachment a Farce
Thus, corruption in the higher judiciary is presumably more than that in the lower judiciary, considering the fact High Courts being vested with the power would take serious steps to curb corruption in the lower judiciary.
From a bird's eye-view, it is apparent that two paralegal systems are functioning: one for the rich and resourceful wielding power and influence, another for those who do not to have the capability to fight injustice. The enforcement of rights and liabilities varies with the positioning in the socio-economic structure.
"Men who make their way to the Bench sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance and other weaknesses to which human flesh is heir." 7
At the time of framing the Constitution, it was believed that misconduct by judges of the higher judiciary would be very rare. The Constitution prescribed impeachment as the only way of Corruption is a malaise that is quick to permeate through all strata of society, if unchecked by appropriate regulatory mechanisms. While corruption is reprehensible in any form, judicial corruption is by far the worst form due to the sublime position of the judiciary. Can we yield to it and be indifferent? Can petty corruption of the kind practiced by clerks be equated with corruption in the judiciary? The underlying philosophy of accountability operates in an attempt to bypass this very perverse manifestation of widespread arbitrariness and corruption. The need for accountability, desirable for the efficient functioning of any institution, assumes a greater significance in this context. removing the judges, that too on the basis of proven misbehaviour or incapacity. 8 These expectations have long been belied by the infamous impeachment of Justice V. Ramaswami. 9 The realisation of impeachment being virtually impossible due to the long drawn out and impractical process 10 The Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to as 'SC') is powerless to take any action against an errant judge and at best can disallow him from hearing cases. The government too, lacks constitutional competence to investigate allegations against the higher judiciary. Till now, there have been only three instances of investigation against the judges of the higher judiciary under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. has instilled a feeling of impunity amongst judges. Witness the farce over Justice Dinakaran, former Chief Justice of High Court of Karanataka, who even while facing impeachment proceedings in the Rajya Sabha over grave charges of corruption, was allowed to take over as Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court. Is it sadly implicit that the people of north-east region merit lower standards of justice?
It is prima facie evident that there is lack of credible mechanisms for securing accountability of the higher judiciary. It thus becomes imperative that the judges are appointed after investigation into their antecedents and class bias. The need of the hour is to curb delinquency in the judiciary to salvage its grace through the enactment of a legislation. There should be zero tolerance towards tainted judges, exemplary punishment being dispensed as a deterrent.
The Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2006 was introduced in the Lok Sabha after incorporating almost all of the Law Commission of India's recommendations. It sought to establish a National Judicial Commission 12 to investigate individual complaints and motions for removal of a judge moved in Parliament. Amongst the many glaring flaws in this Bill was the constitution of the Council consisting of members of the judiciary to investigate and inquire into allegations arising out of complaint or reference. Judicial accountability is generally sought effectively through an external regulatory authority. Ironically, the in-house procedure comprises of sitting judges to investigate into the alleged charges of misconduct, posturing themselves in the garb of an external authority. This negates the very purpose of seeking accountability as it violates the principle of natural justice, that no man shall be the judge in his own cause. 13 The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 14 seems to be the only hope in the right direction. Optimistically, it will not meet the same fate as its predecessor .15
Judicial Independence "The principle of the complete independence of the judiciary from the executive is the foundation of many things in our island life. It is perhaps one of the deepest gulfs between us and all forms of totalitarian rule." -Sir Winston Churchill 16 An independent judiciary is the bulwark of governance. The provisions of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary 17 and the conduct of the Judges, 18 While there has always subsisted a tussle between the legislature and the executive to assume control over the judiciary, whereby duties discharged by judges cannot be discussed in the Parliament or State Legislature insulate the judiciary from political processes. 19 an independent judiciary free from unwarranted political interference has been held to be a sine qua non for a democratic society. 20 Independence of the Judiciary, 1997' 22 emphasized the need for judicial independence. Also, a plethora of rulings pronounced by the Supreme Court have stressed the need for an independent judiciary. In State of Bihar v. Balmukund Shah, 23 judicial independence was said to be a constituent element of the basic structure of the Constitution, the seeds of which were born in Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. 24 Indian administrative law mandates that the possibility of misuse of discretionary power is no excuse for not granting it. But one wonders at the mechanism available to the victims of misuse of such power and its accessibility to the victims. It is well known that the poor don't 'access' the legal system and are drawn into it unwittingly in situations of conflict with the law. 25 The cruel hollowness of law is gradually revealed to the victims who undergo an endless process of re-victimisation.
The inability of the poor to access the justice system can be attributed to illiteracy, cultural inhibitions, bureaucratic and political corruption.
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The perturbing trend of hand-picking judges on the basis of undisclosed criteria reflects an increasing democratic deficit. Judicial independence is compromised when the executive has the Therefore, it is crucial that judges are unusually insensitive to injustice. While placing a premium on judicial independence, the judiciary must capture and maintain the public confidence it seeks to protect. power to appoint or transfer judges, which is used to promote those who make 'correct' decisions. In the pre-1993 scenario, appointments were arbitrary and supersession was not uncommon. It is unfortunate that underlying the written constitution exists an unwritten constitution which embodies protocols of collaboration between the executive and the judiciary. The notion of the seniormost judge of the Supreme Court being elevated as Chief Justice is an aspect of this unwritten constitution. 27
Judicial Accountability
Though increasing transparency is strongly recommended there still subsists a valid fear that this could give room to the executive to step in.
"Only virtuous people are capable of freedom"
Benjamin Franklin 28
It is crucial to understand the relevance of judicial accountability. Judicial independence cannot have an isolated existence because the faith of the citizenry can be reposed only in an accountable judiciary. Only an increased public perception of judicial accountability which is directly dependent on personal accountability can determine the degree of acceptable judicial independence. Thus, judicial accountability is a necessary means to reinforce independence and to ensure an effective judiciary. It is Accountability functions on the framework of seeking integrity which is essential for the efficient functioning of any authority entrusted with responsibility. It primarily entails instilling a sense of transparency and subjecting the judicial regime to a strict public scrutiny so as to prevent any judicial delinquency. therefore submitted that independence and accountability are two sides of the same coin and complement each other.
The need of an accountability mechanism also stems from the overassertiveness of the judiciary to the extent of declaring themselves immune from any form of enquiry into their actions. Such a reprehensible and autocratic practice makes it all the more onerous to ensure that an accountability mechanism to be operative, must establish that Judiciary is about the law and not above the law.
Judicial Accountability v. Judicial Independence
"The greatest strength of the judiciary is the faith people repose in it." 29 It is at this juncture that the long-standing debate between accountability impinging upon the independence of judiciary becomes significant. The propounding fore-fathers of the Constitution did not expressly provide for any mechanism to make the judiciary accountable. 30 This was to prevent the violation of the fundamental edifice of judicial independence, a prerequisite for existence of a free and fair judiciary. 31 The objective was to promote accountability through a mechanism of self-regulation without compromising the facet of independence. Greater accountability eradicates disastrous consequences of letting a dishonest adjudicator decide on the fate of the people who are the real stakeholders in the system of justice. Only in recent times have there been public outcries and debates for holding the judiciary accountable, with the civil society and the media assuming the role of alert watchdogs. 33 The Supreme Court on May 7, 1997 adopted a self-regulating mechanism in the form of a resolution. 34 Later, the Chief Justice's Conference, 1999 endorsed the same, followed by the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002. 35 Unfortunately, due to the absence of any mechanism to verify the compliance of what was declared, there has never been any verification. India has also recently ratified 36 the UN Convention against Corruption 37 , which provides for parties to 'take measure to strengthen integrity and prevent corruption in the judiciary '. 38 It is rather ironical that despite being one of the few nations in the world where a Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter 'RTI') legislation functions effectively, the judiciary seeks insulation from public view defending its independence and still refuses to make public information about the manner in which judges are appointed or transferred. It has gone to the extent of filing a Special Leave Petition directly in the SC against orders of the Chief Information Commissioner (hereinafter 'CIC') asking the court to disclose information about the same. 39 33 See Chaudhury, supra note 4.
Further, contempt powers have also been used to ruthlessly silence outspoken criticism and public exposure of corruption in the judiciary. The shying away from making oneself accountable is sheer naivety as integrity is a means of achieving judicial independence.
Muzzling the Solution?
Unless the level of corruption in the judiciary is exposed and brought out in the public domain, the institutions of governance cannot be activated to take effective measures to eliminate this evil. However, the draconian power of contempt is often used by the judiciary to target public or media scrutiny of judicial misconduct. 40 Confidence in judiciary is maintained by the public perception of the actions of the judiciary and the conduct of its judges over a long period of time. People should be allowed to make an honest fair criticism about the working of the judiciary. To punish and stifle public criticism in an attempt to muzzle dissent seems futile and any such measure would cause far greater damage and lead to a backlash, tarnishing the image of the judiciary. It would make people suspicious that things are more seriously amiss than they had suspected, engendering greater resentment, negating the objective of the Law of Contempt.
There seems to be an irony in the fact that the judges seek to shield themselves through such coercive measures.
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Shanti Bhushan, Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court has raised a historic challenge by questioning the integrity of the highest Thus, the power vested through the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which imposes a fetter on the freedom of speech, should be invoked only as a regulatory measure with utmost caution. judiciary and making charges of corruption against eight of 16 past Chief Justices of India, thereby posing a serious peril before this Republic's crimson future. In an astonishing event, the rarest of the rare kind, he has also defiantly challenged the judiciary to take action against him for contempt.
Parliament must act on this matter of paramount importance and move a motion appointing the highest quasi-judicial body to inquire into the matter. It should be a historic, epic tribunal to try its own judges and it requires an appropriate high-level investigation, with consequential follow-up action that is punitive and reformatory. This is no time to hesitate or involve in an exchange of rhetoric, since remaining deaf or dumb in this situation will be a matter of shock and shame.
If Mr. Bhushan fails in his bid, let him face the consequences of his phenomenal folly. There should be no contempt proceedings to hide delinquent conduct, no secrecy but only transparency, in an epic battle more important than the making of the Constitution. It should be a national hearing by a superlative tribunal which would be a unique, brave judicial odyssey. For, never has such a challenge been raised to a nation's supreme body.
People's Right to Know and the Need for Maintenance of Secrecy in Public Interest
It is significant to note the importance accorded to 'right to know' by the apex court as the irony of the situation hinges upon the same with the impervious judiciary seeking an immunity from the dissemination of information of its own players.
"In a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything, that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have no repercussion on public security. To cover with veil secrecy the common routine business, is not in the interest of the public. Such secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired. It is generally desired for the purpose of parties and politics or personal self-interest or bureaucratic routine. The responsibility of officials to explain and to justify their acts is the chief safeguard against oppression and corruption." 42 The Supreme Court has also declared it mandatory for all electoral candidates to make public the details of assets owned by them, their spouses and dependants. This decision calls for transparency measure in governance, endorsing the right of the citizens to know the acts of public authorities. Scathed with criticisms and a fair share of accolades, the ruling is surely a benchmark in the Indian jurisprudence.
The Appellant had sought to know whether the judges were complying with the Code of Conduct adopted at the full meeting of the Supreme Court in May, 1997. The Supreme Court had been making a distinction between the information held by the Chief Justice's office and by the Supreme Court which was outrightly rejected by the CIC. The CIC ruled that Supreme Court is an institution created by the Constitution and is thus a 'Public Authority'.
The Supreme Court petitioned the Delhi High Court against this order of the CIC, claiming exemption from disclosure of assets under the RTI Act, 2005 as the judges disclosed this information to the CJI under a "fiduciary relationship" and that it was "personal information having no relationship to public interest and would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy" of judges. It further claimed that the CJI was not a 'public authority' under the RTI Act, 2005. The Supreme Court still maintains this stance despite the declaration of assets on the court's website. His Lordship, Justice Ravindra Bhat rejected these claims and held that the CJI had to disclose the information about assets. Since the code of conduct was adopted by the judges themselves, there could not be any claim of fiduciary relationship.
In its appeal against the Delhi High Court order, before its Division Bench, the Supreme Court contended that there was no law providing for declaration of assets to the Chief Justice of India. Information could be sought only if it was held by or was under the control of any public authority under the provision of any statute or any law. It claimed that there was a plethora of information which was available with the judiciary but could not be made public.
The court observed that "well-defined and publicly-known standards and procedures complement, rather than diminish, the notion of judicial independence. Affirming the earlier observations it held that the phrases 'held by' or 'under the control of' under Sec. 2(j) of the RTI Act, 2005 also includes information received or used or consciously retained, by any public authority in its official capacity. The declarations to the Chief Justice of India are made in discharge of the constitutional obligation to maintain higher standards and probity of judicial life and thus, are in larger public interest. The mechanism for declaration of assets should be fair, objective and transparent with a clear set of guidelines. It is opined that disclosure will have little or no impact without open public access or oversight.
It is pertinent to note that the court accorded right to information a status of a constitutional right by not exempting the office of the Chief Justice of India from the transparency framework. Right to information facilitates a vibrant democracy by assisting citizens to gather information required to participate in the democratic process and thus, to have the governors accountable to the governed. The decision comes as a ray of hope in the fight against corruption which has now become a living reality.
The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill 2010
The deepening crisis and public debate catalyzed the need for judicial accountability through The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010, emphasizing the need of preserving the sacrosanct judiciary in the epoch of weakening credibility. This Bill is the legislature's third attempt in making the judiciary transparent. It lays down judicial standards of conduct and provides for the accountability of judges by establishing mechanisms for investigating even individual complaints. The Bill seeks to establish the National Oversight Committee, 46 and an Investigation Committee. Also, it makes annual declaration of assets of the judges mandatory. To protect the judge from defamation, the Bill exempts documents and records of the proceedings pertaining to the complaint from the purview of the RTI Act, 2005 while making the report public. It prohibits the participants from revealing any information regarding the investigation. Having stringent penal provisions in place to check any breach of confidentiality of complaints, it prescribes punishment for frivolous complaints with a maximum of 5 years imprisonment and Rs. 5,00,000 as fine. This mechanism seems rather undesirable as the complaint remains confidential.
The National Oversight Committee has the power to issue advisories or warnings to judges and can also recommend the judge's removal to the President. The imposition of minor measures by an oversight bodies constituted entirely from amongst the judiciary had been declared valid. 48 Also, the provision of appeal to the Supreme Court, a creation of a Supreme Court judgment But it is better to have a broad based screening committee conducting the preliminary investigations which can give adequate representation to members from the executive, legislature, judiciary as well as the Bar. This being a broader based committee would be impartial, transparent as well as credible.
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Time to Off-load allowing a judge to seek 'judicial review' against a Presidential order for his removal has not been negated by the Judicial Standard Accountability Bill, 2010. It put forth that this is against the constitutional provision of the Presidential Order not being open to challenge.
Despite the judgment by the Delhi High Court that created ripples in the judicial circles, the introduction of the Bill seems to be a halfbaked effort as the legislation falters on various counts. The process of impeachment remains the same, which is painfully long and almost next to impossible to execute. It seems to be motivated only to restore public confidence through a confidence trick and clearly lacks the will to bring about a change.
While this rather radical step on the part of legislature is indeed a welcome change in this era of growing concern towards good governance, the Bill might not lead to a balanced law, running the risk of reducing it to a mere paper tiger. Concerns about the same seem to have already surfaced as the road to reform the judiciary seems to be a bumpy ride, requiring apt redressal.
The appointments to the Judiciary have not been able to keep pace with the vacancies, due to haggling at every step over political, The Collegium of judges which is consulted in the matter of appointment of judges suffers from a distressing handicap in its process of selection of judges and is pilloried for making wrong choices or even overlooking the competent contenders. The list of meritorious judges who failed to make it to the apex court is perhaps rather long.
The apex court, in the absence of a Secretariat is overburdened with administrative work. The Collegium lacks the necessary resources to investigate into the competence, character, and integrity of candidates. This makes the Collegium to resort to informal consultations with other judges or members of the Bar. This is a poor substitute for intensive data collection about the nominees' qualifications, standing, merit, integrity, and potential. Thus, the Collegium inevitably picks up from the senior-most judges, overlooking several talented junior judges. The Collegium's deliberations being secret and the opaqueness of the system further insinuate the flack it receives for its misadventures. Sitting judges do find it awkward and embarrassing to hold their brother judges, guilty of misdemeanours.
In certain countries like the UK, South Africa and Canada, National Judicial Appointment Commissions have been instituted to appoint judges. They have an advantage as they being independent and broad-based, represent the views of the judiciary and also those of the executive and other sections of society. The higher judiciary sets the standard for judicial conduct and competency and thus, only those with absolutely unimpeachable integrity and quality should be appointed to these courts, so that they perform their duty with utmost dedication and skill.
Voluntary public disclosure of assets by judges does not seem to be the solution. A constitutional code of conduct and behaviour is needed for the judges. When a finger is pointed at them, a commission of critical incisiveness must be prompt to investigate into charges and if found guilty, they should be removed without impeachment. Impeachment for judicial misconduct seems to be an extravagant affair involving too much of the administrative machinery.
Where there is a high demand for corrupt services it is highly unrealistic to expect incentives such as higher salary alone to offset delinquency. A credible threat of sanctions through institutional control mechanisms is much needed in such a scenario. Prior to becoming judges, they usually amass huge assets while practicing as lawyers and thus, the dignity and power attached to the post of the judge is its only incentive. Therefore, heavy monetary sanctions would rarely serve the purpose which a public humiliation in the form of inquiry or impeachment could do.
With the appeal in the Second Judges Assets Case now lying with the Apex Court to be decided by a constitutional bench, 59 Also, it is pertinent to note that the Constitution should be amended to alter the convention of seniority for elevation as Chief Justice of India. The process to ensure accountability seeks to enhance the integrity and capacity of the judiciary as a whole. An independent full time National Judicial Commission is inevitable for a transparent method for selecting and appointing judges as well as for investigating complaints against them. It is recommended that this Commission should adopt a procedure of submitting a list of candidates from which the judiciary can make its choice. The nominations should be based on the fairness and impartiality of the judge, while taking into account his intelligence and diligence. the greater question looming at large is can the court adjudicate upon a matter in which it is an interested party? In the light of the allegations advanced against several members of the Bench, it seems imperative to us that clear guidelines concerning the constitution of the Bench to hear the matter should be framed. Personal characteristics and potential impediments should be discussed with a scrutiny of his past record. Similar procedure should be adopted to investigate all allegations against judges and take action. The committee in this case should be given the power to summon witnesses, require production of documents and take evidence. This would ensure accountability keeping the independence of the judiciary intact and uncompromised. The proper functioning of this Commission will go a long way in restoring the lustre of the judiciary and transform the Supreme Court of India into Supreme Court for Indians.
